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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.2
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA.!
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
4
ADMIRALTY.
Vessel overtaking another-Rule 22.-Rule 22 of § 4233 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, which directs that " every ves-
sel overtaking any other vessel shall keep out of the way of the last-
mentioned vessel," applies until the overtaking vessel has completely
passed the other: Kennedy v. American Steamboat Co., 12 R. I.
AGENT.
Setting up Illegality of Contract-Estoppel.-If A. obtains money
from B. as for the purpose of paying it for B. to X., upon their agree.
ment with X., and does not so pay it, but converts it to his own use, he
cannot retain it as against B., on the ground that the contract with X.
was illegal: Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Statute may be partly Void and partly Valid.-Gen. Stat. R. I. cap.
79, prohibiting the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors,
contains no exception in favor of importers whose imported liquors
remain in the original packages, or of dealers holding outstanding
licences: Meld, that the chapter, although void as to such imparters,
was valid as to other persons, and if void as to license holders was valid
as to others: State v. Amery, 12 R. I.
A law which is constitutional within certain limitations may, if it
exceeds those limitations, be valid within them and void only for the
excess: Id.
CONTRACT. See Agent; Fraud; Specific Performance.
Rescission-Need not be by Express Agreement.-The rescission of a
contract does not always require the express agreement of both parties ;
but where the contract is executory on both sides, upon non-performance
by one party, the other may declare it rescinded. So held in the case
of a building contract, where the alleged non-performance on plaintiff's
part consisted in a failure to make payments as they fell due by its terms
during the progress of the building: School District v. Hayne, 46 Wis.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Record-Notes of Evidence.-The minutes of the evidence in crim-
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 8 or 9 Otto.
2 From Arnolt Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 12 R. I. Reports.
3 From Hon. Robert White, Reporter, to appear in 14 W. Va. Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. Mt. Conover, Reporter, to appear in 46 Wis. Reports.
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inal actions, though required by the statute to be kept by the judge and
filed with the clerk, are no partof the record proper, and can be brought to
the Supreme Court on a writ of error, only by bill of exceptions; and where
the hill of exceptions merely shows that no such minutes were kept nor
exceptions taken on the trial noted by the judge, and does not show
that his failure in that respect was excepted to, it shows no ground for




Election Canvassers-Functions are Judicial.-Boards of canvassers
sitting to correct voting lists, exercise judicial functions: .eenan v.
Cook, 12 R. I.
Query, whether they are liable in a civil action, for striking a name
from the voting list or for refusing to place a name on it: Id.
But if they are so liable: Held, that they are to judge of the proof
prescribed by Gen. Stat. R. I. chap. 7, § 14, and that in the absence of
evidence showing that they struck a name from the voting list without
proof of disqualification, which was satisfactory to them, judgment must
be given in their favor: Id.
In an action against them for refusing to place a name on the voting
lists: Held, that in the absence of evidence showing that they decided
dishonestly or with a wilful purpose to deprive the plaintiff of his rights,
although their decision was precipitate and erroneous, judgment must be
given in their favor: Id.
EQUITY. See Jurisdiction; Specific Performance.
Practice- Trust.-On a testamentary trustee's bill for instructions:
Held, that the court would only instruct the trustee in regard to cir-
cumstances actually existing or tolerably certain to arise in the course
of his trust management: Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I.
Held, further, that the court would not decide whether an interest
was vested or contingent in a case where the question could only become
important to the trustee by the death of a living cestui: Id.
Practice- Cross-bill.-Generally a cross-bill, ex vi terminorum, implies
a bill brought by a defendant in a suit against the plaintiff in the same
suit, or against other defendants in the same suit, or against both, touch-
ing matters in question in the original bill. It is generally proper when
a cross-bill is filed against co-defendants to make the plaintiff in the
original suit a defendant in the cross-bill: West Va. 0. & 0. L. Co. v.
Vinal, 14 W. Va.
A cross-bill being generally considered as a defence to the original
bill, or as a proceeding necessary to a complete determination of a mat-
ter already in litigation, the complainant is not, at least as against the
complainant in the original bill, obliged to show any ground in equity
to support the jurisdiction of the court. It is treated, in short, as a mere
auxiliary suit or dependency upon the original; but when a cross-bill
seeks not only discovery but relief, care should be taken that the relief
prayed by cross-bill should be equitable relief: Id.
When the cross-bill not only seta up matters of defence to the original
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bill, but prays the specific performance of a parol contract set up as a
defence to the original bill in relation to realty, so far as it prays for
affirmative relief upon said contract, it may be termed a cross-bill for
relief in the nature of an original bill, and it is competent for the court
to dismiss the original bill and afterwards treat and proceed with the
cross-bill in such case as an original bill for relief: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Agent.
EVIDENCE.
Record-Farol Evidence.-An officer's return on an execution is a
part of the record of the case in which the execution issued: Esten v.
Cooke, 12 R. 1.
Parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict the court record.
Hence, in an action of debt on a judgment to which the defendant
pleaded satisfaction, as appeared from the officer's return, in a larger
sum than was admitted in the declaration : a replication, which set forth
that part of the satisfaction pleaded arose from an illegal levy, the pro
ceeds of which the plaintiff was compelled to refund, was held bad or
demurrer, the record evidence of satisfaction being conclusive until
modified by somu proper proceeding operating directly on the record
Id.
Foiromi ADJUDICATION. See Stream.
Parol Evidence of what was deided.-The judgment in a former
suit between the same parties is bonclusive of every issue decided in
that suit, and in the second suit, it can be shown by parol evidence
what was tried in the first, whenever it becomes necessary to do so:
Campbell v. Rankin, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
FRAUD.
Rescission of Contractfor.-In an action to set aside a contract with
defendant upon the ground that it was obtained by his false and fraudu-
lent representations, plaintiff cannot recover if defendant believed the
representations to be true, and plaintiff had equal opportunity with him
of ascertaining their falsity, or had the means of ascertaining it by the
exercise of reasonable diligence and was not prevented from doing so
by any artifice of the defendant: .Aamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis.
HIGHwAY. See Negligence.
Municipal Corporation- Oveflow of Land on Highway/- Change of
Grade.-No action lies against a municipal corporation for allowing the
ordinary and natural flow of surface-water to escape from a highway on
to adjacent land. Nor will an action lie for the results of such usual
changes of grade as must be presumed to have been contemplated and
paid for at the layout of the highway: Wakefield v. Newell, 12 R. I.
A municipal corporation has the -same powers over its highways in
respect to surface-water as an individual has over his land. Inman v.
!-pp, 11 R. I. 520, explained and affirmed: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Separate Estate 9f Wife.-The separate equitable estate of a married
woman is subject to an equitable charge for her individual contracts in
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favor of her creditors, and if a married woman declares expressly and in
writing her intention to charge her separate equitable estate, or if she
so declares verbally and her contract is for the benefit of herself or her
separate estate, the charge will be valid: Elioti v. Gower, 12 R. L
Wife's Separate .Estate-Rer Power over it-Restraint on her Power of
Alienation must be express-Liability for her Debts.-A married woman,
as to the property settled to her separate use, is to be regarded as afeme
sole, and has a right to dispose of all her separate personal estate, and
the rents and profits of her real estate accruing during the coverture, as
if she were a fe.ne sole unless her power of alienation is restrained by
the instrument creating the estate: Radford et al. v. Carwile et al., 13
W. Va.
Such restraint upon her power of alienation will not be implied from
being authorized to dispose of the property in a specified manner. Such
restraint must be either expressed, or so clearly indicated as to be equiva-
lent to an express restraint : Id.
The liability of the separate estate of a married woman to the pay-
ment of all her debts incurred during coverture, is also an incident of
the ownership of such separate estate; and it, too, can only be taken
away by express words, or by an intent so clear as to be the equiva-
lent of express words: rd.
But these incidents, liability to the payment of her debts and her Jus
diponendi, extend no further than to all her separate personal property
and the rents and profits of her separate real estate accruing during the
continuance of the coverture: Id.
The common law effectually protected the corpus of her real estate
against her husband's control and against his debts. And her common-
law disability to make any contract or incur any debt, during her cover-
ture, which will in any manner affect or charge the corpus of her real
estate, whether such real estate be separate property or not, is still in
full force. The corpus of her real estate can only be affected or charged,
by the vendor's lien when it has been reserved or by a conveyance or
specific lien created by deed in which her husband has united with her
and which she executed after privy examination: Id.
The debts of a married woman, for which her separate estate is liable,
are such as arise out of any transaction out of which a debt would have
arisen, if she were a feme sole, except that her separate estate is not
bound by a bond or covenant based on no consideration, such bond or
covenant being void at law, and she not being estopped from showing in
a court of equity that it was based on no consideration : Id.
The consideration which will support an action for her debts or con-
tracts, so as to make her separate estate liable, need not enure to her
own benefit, or that of her separate estate, but it may enure to the
benefit of her husband or any third party or may be a mere prejudice
to the other contracting party; in short, it may be any consideration
which would support the contract if she were a feme sole: Id.
But her separate estate cannot be made liable for the payment of any
debt of her husband or of any other person, unless she has agreed to
pay the same by some contract in writing, signed by her or by some
one authorized by her: Id.
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JURISDICTION.
Statutory Remedies.-Whenever a new right is granted by statute,
or a new remedy for violation of an old right, or whenever such rights
and remedies are dependent on state statutes or acts of Congress, the
jurisdiction of such cases, as between the law side and the equity side
of the federal courts, must be determined by the essential character of
the case, and unless it comes within some of the recognised heads of
equitable jurisdiction, it must be held to belong to the other: Van Nor
den v. Morton, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1878.
JURY.
Objection to Juror-Rihts of Jurors not to (kiminate themselves.-
Though an objection to a juror, as legally disqualified, be improperly
overruled, the error is cured if it appear affirmatively that he was not
on the jury when the case was tried, and it does not appear that the
party's right of peremptory challenge was abridged in getting him off:
Burt v. Panjaud, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
A man offered as a juror is, no more than a witness, compelled to dis-
close under oath his guilt of a crime which would disqualify him. The
party relying upon such disqualification must prove it by other evidence
if the juror declines to answer: Id.
MiNmS. See Alrespass.
Act of 1866-Ditches and Canals over Public Land.-The ninth
section of the Act of Congress of July 26th 1866, "granting the right
of way to ditch and canal owners over the public lands, and for other
purposes," only confirms to the owners of water-rights and of ditches and
canals, on the public lands of the United States, the same rights which
they held under the local customs, laws and decisions of the courts,
prior to its passage; and confers no additional rights upon the owners
of ditches, subsequently constructed : ennison, Executor of Titcomb,
v. Kirk, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The origin and general character of the customary law of miners
stated and explained: Id.
By that law the owner of a mining claim and the owner of a water-
right in California hold their respective properties from the dates of
their appropriation, the first in time being the first in right; but where
both rights can be enjoyed without interference with or material impair-
ment of each other, the enjoyment of both is allowed: Id.
By that law a person cannot construct a ditch to convey water across
the mining claim of another, taken up and worked according to that
law before the right of way was acquired by the ditch-owner, so as to
prevent the further working of the claim in the usual manner in which
such claims are worked, nor so as to cut off the use of water previously
appropriated by the miner for working the claim, or for other beneficial
purposes: Id.
MORTGAGE.
All Conveyances as Security for Money Lent-Parol Evidence.&-It
is the established doctrine, that a conveyance made as security for a loan
of money whatever may be its form, will be treated by equity as a mort-
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gage, and that parol evidence will be admitted to show that a deed abso-
lute on its face was intended as such a security: Butler v. Butler, 46
Wis.
Personal Property to be subsequently Acguired.-In Rhode Island, a
mortgage of personal property to be subsequently acquired, creates a.
lien on such property when acquired, which is valid in equity against
the mortgagor or his voluntary assignee; Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. I.
The question whether a mortgage, which allows the mortgagor to
retain possession of the mortgaged personalty or to sell and replace the
same, is fraudulent as against his creditors, should be determined by a
jury from the circumstances attending its execution: Id.
MIUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Highway.
Liability for Acts of Officers.-The City Council of Providence di-
rected the highway commissioners to cut down a certain street to grade
provided the adjoining owners agreed not to make any claim for dam-
ages. By inadvertence the cutting was done without the specified agree-
ment on the part of one owner. In an action for damages brought by
this owner against the city: Held, that the city was not liable : Don-
nelly v. Tripp, 12 R. I.
A municipal corporation is not liable for the acts of its officers though
done under color of authority, unless such acts were authorized or rati-
fied or done in good faith, pursuant to some general authority given
Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Bailee for 1ire-Presumption-Evidence.-Although where defend-
ant's negligence is an essential element in plaintiff's cause of action,
the burden is on plaintiff of proving such negligence, yet where plain-
tiff showed that his goods were injured while in possession of defendant
as a bailee for hire, and that defendant when applied to by him, gave
no account of the injury except merely that it occurred while defend-
ant's agents were performing an act, which when performed with due
care, does not ordinarily cause such an injury: Beld, that this was evi-
dence from which the jury might infer negligence: first v. Milwaukee,
Lake Shore and Western Railway Co., 46 Wis.
NUISANCE.
Flowaye-lzterferenee with Highways-In equity proceedings the
question at issue between the complainant and the respondent resolved
itself upon the proof into whether the complainant was entitled to equi-
table relief for the inundation of his land and of a private pass.way,
connecting his land with a highway, which was caused by a dam built
by the respondent, and also whether the complainant was entitled to
equitable relief for the interruption thus caused to his access to the
highway. It appearing that a new and more convenient highway than
the old one had been laid out over and along the dam, and also that the
slope of the dam covered part of the old highway and also that the loca-
tion of the old highway had never been legally changed by the town au-
thorities. Held, that the dam was a nuisance in law but not in fact; Held,
further, that as the public received no detriment, the complainant could
only have relief for his individual injury; ieldjfurther, that the com-
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plainant was entitled to relief for the inundation; Beld, further, that
the complainant would be sufficiently relieved by an enlargement of the
water aperture of the dam. And it appearing that raising the grade
of the private passway would give the complainant convenient access to
the new highway: Held, that the interruption to the complainant's access
to the highway was capable of pecuniary compensation and therefore
remediable at law: Held, further, that the decree should be without
prejudice to the complainant's legal remedy unless the parties preferred
to have a master ascertain the complainant's damage : Stone v. Peck-
am, 12 R. I.
POSSESSION.
Prima facie Evidence of Title.-In an action of ejectment or tres-
pass to land, actual possession, or receipt of rent by plaintiffs prior to
eviction, is prima facie evidence of title, on which recovery can be had
against a naked trespasser: Burt v. Panjaud, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1878.
Titleprimafacie imples-E'tent of actual Possession.-Title draws
after it possession of property not in adverse possession of another:
Moore v. Douglass, 14 W. Va.
Actual possession of a part of a tract of land under a bonafide claim,
and color of title to the whole, is possession of the whole, or so much
thereof as is not in the adverse possession of others ; 1d.
And in such caie the party in actual possession of such part has a
sufficient possession of the residue of the tract to entitle him to the
action of unlawful entry and detainer against a wrongdoer who enters
upon such residue, who has not the right of entry thereon, but the
owner of such residue, or those authorized under him, may lawfully
enter upon such residue without force and hold the same : Id.
SPzCIFIO PERFORMANCE
Matter of Discretion-Parol Contract respecting Land-Part Per-
formanc.-Generally when a contract respecting real property is in its
nature and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of
course for courts of equity to decree specific performance of it, as it is
for a court of law to give damages for a breach of it. But the court
of equity may, under certain circumstances, refuse its aid and leave
the parties to their legal remedies, or it may rescind the contract and
place the parties in stutu quo by making compensation, &c. : W. Va.
O.& 0.L. Co.v. Ftinal, 14 W. Va.'
In the exercise of the equity branch of jurisprudence respecting the
rescission and specific performance of contracts, the court is governed
by that sound and reasonable discretion which governs itself as far as it
may, by general rules and principles, but at the same time which with-
holds or grants relief according to the circumstances of each particular
case, when these rules and principles will not furnish any exact measure
of justice between the parties: Id.
In the case of parol contracts for land, partly executed, it is generally
the duty of the court to exert proper means to ascertain the terms of
the contract, whenever it clearly appears that a contract did exist upon
the faith of which one of the parties has expended his money, &c., and
this in order to prevent a failure of justice: Id.
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.Parol Contract 71lout Lnd-(onsi, eration.-A parol agreement
between father and .son. that on condition the son will enter upon a
certain tract of land and improve it. the fither will make him a deed
for same, and in pursuance and oil fiith of such agreement the son
enters upon the land and occupies and improves it, is sustained by a
sufficient consideration, and should be specifically performed: Lorentz
v. Lorentz, 14 W. Va.
Such contracts before they can be performed, in a court of equity
must be established by competent and satisflictory proof, which mubt be
clear, definite and certain: Id.
STATUTE. See Constitutional Law.
Construction of.-In construing a statute, aid may be derived from
attention to the state of things as it appeared to the legislature when
the statute was enacted : Platt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., S. 0. U.
S., Oct. Term 1878.
STREA-M.
Riparian Riglhts-Use of Water by Upper Owner-Former .Tudg-
ment.-In an action by a lower against an upper proprietor on a small
running stream, where the wrong alleged was that defendant, by keep-
ing a large number of hogs enclosed in a yard on his premises upon
such stream, and so fouling the stream, had deprived plaintiff of his ben-
eficial use of the water on his premises for culinary and other domestic
purposes, the court charged the jury that each proprietor was entitled
to the use and enjoyment of the stream in its natural flow, subject to
its reasonable use by other proprietors, that each had an equal right to
the use of the stream for the ordinary purposes of his house and farm,
and for the purpose of watering his stock, even though such use might
in some degree lessen the volume of the stream or affect the purity of
the water; that the lower proprietor had no superior right in this regard
over the upper, that if in its natural state, the stream was useful both
for domestic uses and for watering stock, but the use for ordinary stock
purposes was more valuable or beneficial for all the owners along the
stream than the use for domestic purposes, then the less valuable must
yield to the more valuable use; but that its reasonable use for all pur-
poses should be preferred if possible; and that the jury must determine
from all the facts, taking into account the size, nature and condition of
the stream, whether defendant made a reasonable and proper use of it.
Held, on defendant's appeal, that there was no error in the instructions.
Hazeltine, Adnz'r, v. Case, 46 Wis.
While an appeal by defendant from judgment of a justice's court in
plaintiff's favor in this action (which was tried by the justice without a
jury), was pending in the circuit court, plaintiff commenced a second
action before the justice for damages accruing to him after the date of
this action, from defendant's use of the water of the same stream so as
to deprive plaintiff of his reasonable enjoyment thereof; his complaint
containing averments v.ry similar to those in this action, except as to
time, and when the present action was tried, the second was pending in
the circuit court on plaintiff's appeal from the justice's judgment upon a
verdict in defendant's favor. ield, that the judgment last named was
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aVomputation of-.nday.-By the decree of a Probate Court com.
missioners were appointed on the insolvent estate of a decedent, and six
months were allowed to creditors to prove their claims against the estate.
The six months expired on Sunday. The commissioners held their last
meeting on the following day: edd, that the acts of the commissioners
were according to law: Barnes v. Eddy, 12 R. I.
Held, further, that the duty of the commissioners required them to
sit on the last day of' the six months : Id.
Whenever a given period is fixed within which an act must be done,
Sundays which fall within the period make a part of it; but if the
period closes on Sunday the act may be done on the following day: Id.
TRESPASS. See Possession.
Possession as Evitenw of Title-Mining Claims.-Possession of land
by a plaintiff in trespass quare elausum fregit is prima facie evidence
of title, and is sufficient for a recovery against a mere trespasser:
Campbell v. Rankin, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
While the local record of a mining community is the best evidence
of the rules and customs governing their mining interests, it is not the
best or only evidence of priority or extent of actual possession : Id.
The Act of Congress of May 10th 1872, section 5, gives no greater
effect to the record of such mining claims than is given to the registra-
tion laws of the states, and this has never been held to exclude proof




Waiver of Lien.--If a contract is made for the sale of land, and
nothing be said in the contract about the vendor's lien being reserved,
and bond and personal security be taken for the purchase-money, this
alone will not amount to a waiver of the vendor's lien, but if it be shown
by direct evidence or by the circumstances of the case, that the vendor
relied only on the bond and personal security, the vendor's lien is waived,
and he would be required to execute a deed without reserving the lien.
Before the passage of the statute requiring an express reservation of
this lien on the face of the deed, the execution of the deed and the
taking of personal security, would amount to a waiver of the vendor's
lien: Warren v. Branch, 14 W. Va.
WATzas AND WATERCOURSES. See Highway; Mznes ; Nuisances
,Stream.
